Securing SLOCs by Cooperation - ChinaÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s Perspective of Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean by Ye Hailin
Securing SLOCs by Cooperation
--China’s Perspective of Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean
Ye Hailin
International Maritime Conference 3
National Maritime Policy Research Center
Bahria University Karachi, Pakistan
Abstract
The essay addresses that, after 30years open and reform policy, with the increasing
connectivity with the rest of the world, China has been transforming from a traditional land
power to a new type of sea power. This transformation requires a sophisticate and
modernized Chinese navy, and more frequent international engagement on maritime
security, but it not necessary means that China would follow the model of traditional
Western sea power to seek for its regional thalassocracy.
The essay argues that, at least in the medium term, even for the long term, China’s
maritime strategy pursues to control its marginal sea and secure its SLOCs. Chinese sea
policy is and will be peace-nature and encourages regional and international maritime
cooperation.
The essay points out, the strategic value of the Indian Ocean for China, an energy-thirsty
giant is vital. The vulnerability of the SLOCs for China from the Gulf to the Malacca Straits
has drawn a lot of concern of China, and to secure this energy transportation channel has
become a significant component of China’s maritime security strategy. Meanwhile, more
intensive participation and wide presence of Chinese Navy and merchant marine in the
Indian Ocean will make greater contribution to its Western Development Strategy, and also
could be regarded as an indirect strategy to enhance China’s position on its marginal water
dispute with some Southeast Asia countries.
The essay suggests that, in the framework of China’s Indian Ocean security strategy,
Pakistan should be regarded as a decisive partner and Gwadar project should lay the
cornerstone for this strategy. The meaning of Gwadar port for China is a bridge to reach
energy diversity, not a fort to scout and dominate the Indian Ocean.
The article consists of four parts, 1. Review of China’s Maritime Strategy; 2. Chinese
Perspective on Sea Power; 3. "String of Pearls" or “Line of Life”; and 4. Secure SLOCs via
Cooperation.
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Preface
Chinese Navy set sail for anti-piracy mission from a port in province of Hainan for
Somalia on December 26
th, 2008. Senior officers from Chinese Foreign Ministry and Navy
emphasized the military move is “supportive to the relevant resolutions of the UN Security
Council and efforts of the global cooperation in combating piracy” and “our target is, on one
hand, to protect the ships and personnel passing through the Gulf of Aden and waters off
the coast of Somalia. On the other hand, we are in charge of safeguarding the vessels
transporting humanitarian materials from international organizations.” [1]
However, this historic expedition to the Indian Ocean of the small scale Chinese Navy
fleet[2] still caused wide suspicion. Even a ridiculous Internet rumor[3] echoed hot debates
on the conventional mass media of China and relevant country. The rumor and its spreadproved how serious the mistrust and misunderstanding to Chinese Navy’s expedition are. It
should be pointed out that the misunderstanding not only occurred in South Asia, but also in
China itself, especially in some young military amateurs who were fuzed by improper
nationalism. Some cheered the expedition as a decisive action of “sailing to glorious” and
the beginning of China’s maritime era, but in fact, the mission is just a safeguard action
under the permission of UN solution and restricted in untraditional security field.
Frankly, China should take part of responsibility of the suspicious atmosphere around the
expedition, for Beijing never published its official Maritime Strategy. China only explained its
military maritime intention in its serial National Defense White Papers which the naval parts
usually consisted of one or two pages and only provided brief introduction. It left huge
illegibility to be misinterpreted.
With the expanse of Chinese overseas interests, it’s predictable that China will be more
active on international maritime move. In this circumstance, more transparence approach is
required for China to clear its maritime request, to define its maritime interests and to
elaborate its maritime strategy.
Review of China’s Maritime Strategy
For the recent six centuries, China had been a land power in nature which based on its
agriculture-oriented economy. Zheng He（郑和）, the great vanguard of Chinese oceangoing
exploration is just a shooting star in Chinese history, his cause had never been inherited till
1950s, after the victory of Anti-Japanese war and the People’s Republic came into existence.
From 1950s to 1980s, in spite of suffering from China’s backward economy and political
turbulence, Chinese Navy and merchant marine still made remarkable progresses, laid the
foundation for the development of its maritime cause after the adoption of open and reform
policy.
Since 1980s, China got rid of isolation status and shifted from “inward-leaning economy” to
“outward-leaning economy” step by step, the connectivity between China and the whole
world has been getting closer and closer, the importance of sea for China has been
observably increased. China, as “an increasingly capable and influential nation, is acquiring
a growing interest in maritime security and commerce, which are essential to its national
program of peaceful development”.[4] With development of its maritime cause and expanse
of its overseas interests and requests, China has been transformed from a traditional land
power to a new sea power.
China has 18,000 km of coastline, claims over 4 million square km of sea area, and
operates over 1,400 harbors. In 2006, China’s maritime industries generated an estimated
10 percent of its GDP[5], a significant increase from the last years. It is estimated that
contribution of maritime industries to China’s economy could reach $1 trillion by July, 2020.
Meanwhile, the rapid growth of China’s economy relies on its international trade more and
more, although China also tries to boost its domestic demand. Even suffered by the current
global financial crises, the favorable balance of China in January, 2009, jumped to 39 billion
US$, a new record for recent six months. The world not only witnessed China’s fast
economic growth, but also more active global participation of Chinese enterprises. Chinese
energy and natural resource investors and textiles, home appliances and even automobile
manufactures rushed into Africa and Latin America, where links with China mainly by
maritime transportation. Another factor which shapes China’s new sea strategy is its huge
demand for overseas energy. China is now the second energy consumer of the world, and60% its hydrocarbon energy consumption came from the Gulf and transited via Malacca
Strait.
Chinese enormous international trade profit, close global connectivity and extreme energy
demands, all of them highly rely on the security of Chinese Sea Lines of Communication
(SLOCs).The development of maritime industries, the dependence on the security of SLOCs
forced China to rethink its traditional conservative maritime strategy. In general, “the
ultimate drive to develop sea power is oversea trade”.[6] It also means that increasing
overseas trade needs to be protected by a strengthening Navy, and as coherent
consequence, the expanse of sea power.
China realized that sea power and right are vital for the future development of China, or
Chinese “national great renaissance”. To protect its overseas interests, to control its
marginal water territory, to secure its SLOCs, draw more and more attention of Chinese
government, mass media, think tanks and the public. Although China took more active
approach on maritime issues, its maritime strategy is still in peace nature and emphasis the
importance of regional and international cooperation.
Chinese scholars often quoted Chinese history as evidence to prove peaceful nature of
Chinese regional and international policy, unfortunately, such kind of address usually aren’t
convincible. Not only because the truth of history is always arguable, but as a common
sense, the behavior of people is flexible, what people did yesterday doesn’t illustrate his
action tomorrow. In the context of international relations, history just provides lessons and
references, but far away from enough to offer the parameters to predict future action of
state. Actually, the decisive factor to shape Chinese foreign relation and its maritime
strategy is the model of Chinese rising.
The economic miracle of China——30 years fast growth——basically is the consequence of
its open and reform policy. This policy leads to highly mutual dependence between China
and its global and regional partners. China never tried to build up a separated economic
community which parallel with the global market. On the contrary, China is the most
dramatic advocator for the global integrity and trade freedom. China clearly realizes that its
wealth and influence come from its global participation and connectivity, which highly relies
on a peaceful international and regional environment. China regards the peaceful
environment as pre-condition of its rising, so seeking for peace became the priority of
Chinese foreign policy. Guided by this diplomatic credendum, China believes that seeking
deeper understanding between China and other regional and global powers would help
reduce tensions and foster more effective multilateral solutions to its security concerns,
such as energy transportation, overseas interests protection and so on .
Chinese foreign policy and maritime strategy character as their peaceful nature, but
peaceful doesn’t mean passive. Driven by the expanse of maritime interests, China launched
more frequent maritime move in recent years, China emphasized keeping the stability isn’t
contradictory with maintaining its rights. China is cautious to avoid the potential conflicts
with its neighbors on maritime issues, meanwhile take more steps to attend international
and bilateral joint action, such as naval exercise, natural disaster rescue and anti-piracy
mission. The Chinese Navy actively engaged in “military diplomacy” in recent years,
particularly in the form of joint military exercises with other nations. China expect that, with
the help of such MOOTW (military operations other than war), China could enhance its soft
power and increase its influence in its neighboring region.
Adapt to transformation of Chinese maritime strategy, Chinese navy abandoned its coastal
defensive tradition. Since 1980s, Chinese Navy “has realized a strategic transformation to
offshore defensive operations”.[7] To reach this transformation, China makes great effortson building up a more sophisticate and modernized navy, Chinese Navy “has been striving
to improve in an all-round way its capabilities of integrated offshore operations, strategic
deterrence and strategic counterattacks, and to gradually develop its capabilities of
conducting cooperation in distant waters and countering non-traditional security threats, so
as to push forward the overall transformation of the service” and meanwhile the Navy
“works to increase the country's capabilities to maintain maritime, space and
electromagnetic space security and to carry out the tasks of counter-terrorism, stability
maintenance, emergency rescue and international peacekeeping. It takes military
operations other than war (MOOTW) as an important form of applying national military
forces”.[8] The Somalia move of Chinese Navy is actually kind of MOOTW.
Chinese Perspective on Sea Power
Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of US Navy War College and outer space policy expert
discussed the vast misinterpretation in Sino-US space relationship studies in her book. She
pointed out that US frequently trends to ignore the common sense that “think outside box
does not necessarily reflect US government policy”[9] and misinterpret un-authoritative
academic research into official policy when US researches the China’s space policy and
activities. She quoted the story of Wang Hucheng （王虎成） and his opinion on so called
“Unrestricted Warfare”（“超限战”）. Actually, such phenomenon not only occurred in space
field, but also in a lot of countries’ understanding on Chinese maritime policy.
Just as I mentioned in the preface, China should be responsible for the widespread
phenomenon because China usually prefers not talk too much about its intension voluntarily
and forwardly. Wang’s story was recurred in maritime policy studies in another version, the
version of Ni Lexiong（倪乐雄）. Ni is a professor of Shanghai Institute of Politics and
Law[10], his essay ”Sea Power and China’s Development” was described as “unabashed
advocacy for China’s Sea Power” by some US experts and he is regarded as representative
of Chinese school of Mahan thought. Ni indeed is one of leading maritime strategy scholars
in China, his arguments on building up a strong navy spread widely by Internet and are very
popular among the young people, but it is obviously that his argument does not stand for
Chinese official policy and only one of many views on Chinese maritime strategy----although
maybe the most famous and furious one.
One of lessons should be learned from Ni and Wang’s storied is that correct inference about
any country’s any official policy could not be drawn only from a few isolated words of
scholars or mass media. But Ni’s argument and its popularity do indicate that after 30 years
splendid economic growth, how solicitous Chinese demos’ expectation of strong sea power
is. From 1840 to 1949, China’s sea power existed in name only and paid enormous costs for
this fatal weakness——countless casualties, innumerable war indemnity and indelible
humiliation caused by many times defeated wars with the global and regional sea powers,
such as Britain and Japan.
Seeking for strong sea power not only bases on the request of increasing connectivity
between China and the rest of world, but also is a national-widely mental demand. Chinese
government should not ignore it, although this mental demand always is quoted as the
evidence of growing of “Chinese Nationalism” and interpreted as a threat to the regional
stability by Western world and some China’s neighboring countries. Based on the requests
of actual interests and mental demand Chinese government would be remiss, if it doesn’t
seek for stronger sea power and its performance, a powerful navy.In fact, such mental demand is not unique phenomenon for China. Basically, to build up
more advanced and effective defense power is universal request for any country if the
costs—technology gap, budget limitation and geopolitical consequence—were not problems.
But there is an expression that “only poets write strategy without a budget”, China’s
maritime strategy also is restricted by the factors mentioned above. China is still a
developing country and continuously purchases a relative long-term peaceful environment.
Its economic and political wherewithal is limited, and it has long way to go toward acquiring
sophisticate and usually expensive technology to support modernization of its navy,
meanwhile, China also seriously concerns the so-call “China Threat” and hostile attention of
Western world and neighboring countries to Chinese Navy modernization projects, tries to
avoid the contradiction between the expanse of sea power and its traditional principles of
peace and development.
In principle, that is unquestionably China will impose more active maritime strategy, seek
for more effective sea power and accordingly to build up a more sophisticate navy, but
China also clearly acknowledges that sea power could be divided into different levels and
each level requires different economic and political investments, meanwhile leads to
different geopolitical impact.
Basically, Sea Power could be divided into four levels: The first and essential level is
marginal sea control. The second level is security of SLOCs, which only requests to
ensure the safety of the merchant ships, which could be reached by multiple ways including
safeguard mission of navy fleet or friendly geopolitical environment provided by successful
diplomatic inter-activities, also could realized by international or regional coalition missions.
The third level is navigate freedom, which seeks for liberty of maritime mobility, not
necessarily to monopolize ocean, but capable to confront potential threat or hostile action;
these two levels of sea power require a strong navy and usually unilateral and exclusive
action. The fourth and the top level is thalassocracy or Maritime Supremacy, which
leads to the approach of ocean dominance, intents to deny the access to its dominant water
territory of any other navy, destroy the hostile navy fleet on the request;
During Bush, Jr. Administration, US military has replaced its threat-based planning with
capabilities-based planning, intended to defeat any conceivable attack in anytime from
anywhere. Chinese Navy even did not reach the level of threat-based planning, still presses
forward to upgrade its capability to fit its request-based planning. In the context of Chinese
navy strategy, the difference between the threat-based planning and the request-based
planning is that the potential hostile navy forces of China on Pacific Ocean is the global
ocean hegemony and its coalition. It is not possible for China to imagine to build up a strong
Navy or to invent some kind of “Shashoujian”(杀手锏)[11] to deter the adversary’s hostile
intention. Due to its model of planning and limitation of capability, China’s perspective on
Sea Power is also far away from US and its traditional school t of Mahan thought.
In the medium and long term, to establish the thalassocracy, even to seek for Navigate
Freedom would not be the intention of China’s maritime strategy. Because the model and
path of China’s rising don’t request these two levels of sea power. Their costs would
counteract the potential benefits even exceed the latter. It is highly possible that the
ambition for the thalassocracy or the Navigate Freedom of China would result in serious
backfire effect to impact China’s peace and development, for such ambitions definitely lead
to overthrow current regional maritime order, or even topple international system, which
provide maybe not very satisfied but acceptable peace environment for China, a supposed
decisive precondition for Chinese national great renaissance.Thus China will impose a limited maritime strategy and seek for primary levels of sea power
for at least medium term. It intends to realize effective marginal sea control and ensure
security of SLOCs. For the marginal sea control, China will try to obtain regional and
tactical naval advantage to deter separatism of Taiwan and to protect its natural resources
in South China Sea and East China Sea. For the disputes with some neighboring countries,
China suggests adoption of the principle of Detaining Disputes and Developing Together,
meanwhile it insists on the sovereignty over disputes territories. It is a relative conservative
approach for China, sometimes lead to nationalism echoes inside China.
But for the security of SLOCs level, Chinese attitude has been shifting from its long term
passive and conservative approach to more active and energetic engagement in recent
years. China considers that, marginal sea disputes is avoidable risk and potential benefits
brought by military intervention even a successful limited war is marginalized but with
highly cost. On the contrary, to ensure the security of SLOCs, it’s an essential request for
China’s development, just as what mentioned above, China has been already highly relied
on its connectivity with rest of the world. The security of maritime transportation occupied
the priority of Chinese maritime security strategy.
The vulnerability of “sea line of life” from the Gulf to Malacca Strait draws much attention of
Chinese government and demos, because it transports 80% of Chinese imported energy and
links China with African continent, the new and fastest growing market for Chinese
enterprises. Unlike the potential and avoidable risks on the marginal sea, the vulnerability of
the Indian Ocean is “present and clear dangers” due to rampant piracy, hostile regional
military situation and atrocious geographic condition. It required Chinese more active
engagement in multiple ways.
"String of Pearls" or “Line of Life”?
On 21st, February, the Chinese Navy DDG-168 Guangzhou set sail for the North Arabian
Sea to participate the joint Naval exercises “Aman-09”, thus, DDG-169 and DDG -168, only
two of Chinese Navy’s the most sophisticated homemade destroyers Class 052B, both were
expedited to the Indian Ocean to carry out the different but kin missions. Even now the
battle effectiveness of Chinese surface warships deployed in the Indian Ocean is still very
limited, especially comparing with existed navy fleet of the other sea powers. Chinese Navy
did not change the current military situation in the Indian Ocean. It lacks of such capability
and actually did not have such ambition at all. However, the two destroyers’ move should
be regarded as an emblem of transform of Chinese maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean to
more active and energetic engagement.
Since the first years of 21
st Century, China use the term of “Malacca Dilemma” to describe
the potential problems of sea routes crucial to China’s trade and energy transportation,
especially the fragile Malacca Straits. China not only concern the danger of being subject to
interdiction from another state, but also the highly possibility of the Straits obstruction
causes by artificial accidents or natural disasters, after all, the Straits is too narrow and too
busy, any gigantic oil tanker’s leak accident could force the Straits to be almost completely
closed down. Actually, the similar accident occurred before in other sea channel, and the
question is not whether it would happen in the Malacca Strait or not, but when and how
serious. At the same time, the international war on terror has also raised the specter of
economic terrorism aimed at disrupting commerce via the Straits.
In fact, the “Malacca Dilemma” is not all contents of Chinese concern on the security of
SLOCs, the security situation of the “front end” of Chinese SLOCs is not much better than
the Straits at all, if it is not more troublesome. That is Chinese sea “line of life” from theGulf via the vast water territory of the Indian Ocean to the Straits. The strategic importance
of the Indian Ocean for China is exactly as same as the Malacca Straits; actually, they are
the two sides of one coin, or the two ends of one bridge. Most of Chinese merchant ships
and oil tanks which transit via the Malacca Straits sailed for long time voyage before they
entered that narrow ocean channel. SLOCs are just like chain, any threats to any links of
them would definitely cause the same impact to China; it is true that the Malacca Straits is
very convenient for severing Chinese energy blood vessel, but obviously, it is not the only
place. Any parts of the SLOCs on the Indian Ocean could play the same role for any Chinese
potential advisories—states or non-states.
One version of the so-called “Chinese threat” is the ambition of China to build up “string of
pearls” alongside the Indian Ocean, especially Indian’s neighboring countries. China intends
to establish close military and political connect and cooperation with Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, and Burma. In July 2006, in his report for the Pentagon, Lt.Col. Christopher J.
Pehrson listed each “Pearl” of the “String”, he addressed that “each ‘pearl’ in the ‘String of
Pearls’ is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. Hainan Island, with
recently upgraded military facilities, is a ‘pearl.’ An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island,
located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a ‘pearl.’ A
container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a ‘pearl.’ Construction of a deep
water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a ‘pearl,’ as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar,
Pakistan.”[12]
China did sign a series of contracts of ports construction projects, including the most
outstanding one Gawdar project. The port construction projects cooperation between China
and South Asia countries echoed wide spread suspicious not only in this region but also
globally. Lt.Col. Pehrson claimed that “string of pearls” as “the manifestation of China’s
rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop
special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South
China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian
Gulf”. [13]
As response, China always argues that all the cooperation on ports development with its
South Asian partners are peaceful in nature and economic interests oriented, however, in
principal, all merchant ports could be used as naval base or at least provide logistic support
for warship fleets. The dual-used nature of ports just like space technology, unquestionably,
a set of satellite launcher could be developed as a missile. Dual use technology and facility
are not always easy to identify. In this context, both Chinese argument and others’
suspicious sound convincible. Whose opinion is accepted only depends upon different
stances and perspectives of audiences.
The priority of Chinese maritime security strategy is to secure SLOCs, China has been a net
oil importer since 1993, is the world's number two oil consumer after the US. The strategic
importance of imported energy and the security of its transportation for China is clear and
self-evident. Just like an Indian correspondent said, for China, “in the presence of sporadic
power shortages, growing car ownership and air travel across China and the importance of
energy to strategically important and growing industries such as agriculture, construction,
and steel and cement manufacturing, pressure is going to mount on China to access energy
resources on the world stage. As a result, energy security has become an area of vital
importance to China's stability and security.”[14]
Ironically, the author argued that China’s quest for energy security would possibly lead to
“New Cold War”[15]. If China desires for the regional hegemony, the New Cold War is not
only possible, but inevitable. However, just as mentioned before, the priority of Chinese
maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean is to secure the security of SLOCs. How China couldmake itself safer via involving of so-call “New Cold War” and taking a risk to challenge the
existed regional and international sea supremacies?
Trying to impose a blockade surrounding its regional adversary or competitors is not only
totally meaningless in politics perspective for China, but also obtrusive stupid in military
practice. China didn’t own the “blue water navy” permanent deployed in this region. Without
the protection of an active and effective ocean warship fleet, several ports separated with
thousands of miles distance could not form so-called “string of pearls”, on the contrary, just
a crowd of “sitting ducks” which could be easily eliminated by regional maritime supremacy.
Actually, based on the requests to ensuring the security of its SLOCs, China does need
several ports for its safeguarding fleets to receive logistics supply. For instance, Chinese
Navy DDG-169 and DDG-171 took four days voyage to enter the Indian Ocean from their
base in Hainan Island, and without logistics supply from land bases, only could carry out 90
days mission. Even for counter-piracy mission, lack of logistics support seriously restrains
the combat capability and endurance of voyage of Chinese small scale fleet.
Since 26
th, December, 2008, Chinese Navy fleet had already provided safeguard for 63
merchant ships in 22 missions, patrolled in the Indian Ocean for almost three months, so
the question is what about the next step of DDG-169 and DDG-171? China could make a
choice from three options, Option One: Receiving supplement from some temporary
logistic base. From 22
nd to 23
rd February, Chinese Navy fleet anchored at Aden merchant
port for logistics supply. This is the first time that Chinese Navy received supplement from
foreign merchant port during its MOOTW. However, temporary logistics supply just could
extend the mission for a certain term, finally, it still had to back to option two or option
three, because as a conventional fleet, DDG-169 and DDG-171 were not designed to
conduct long term combat mission in the ocean;
Option Two: Claiming the mission accomplished and going back home, leaving the
safeguard mission to other foreign Navies existed in the North Arabia Sea; Option Three:
Setting up a long term cooperation with some regional partners and seeking for a
permanent logistic base in the Indian Ocean to make sure that in case of emergency, just
like accident of “TianYu” (天裕)，the destroyers wont take another four days to come back.
The option which finally be selected indicates the perspective of maritime security of
Chinese Navy and China itself.
Conclusion: Secure SLOCs via Cooperation
To fulfill the mission of safeguarding and counter-privacy, Chinese Navy should be deployed
in the Indian Ocean for longer term, which requests supports from the regional partners and
encourages cooperative approach. Unilateral action won’t help to improve the situation. In
fact, cooperative approach is the only effective method to ensure the security of Chinese
SLOCs which only request acceptable costs and would bring marvelous benefits, not just
allow Chinese Navy deploying longer time or expanse Chinese soft power by an “existence
fleet”.
The factors which could threat the security of Chinese SLOCs in the Indian Ocean basically
are similar with those in the Malacca Straits, privacy, artificial or natural accident, existence
of foreign Naval bases in that region, and the last but not least one, in the context of Grand
Strategy, “uncertain trumpet” of the regional sea powers. All the threats could be
confronted or even neutralized by a powerful navy fleet permanently deployed but with
highly expensive financial and potential political costs.Base on cost-benefit assessment, comparing with unilateral action aiming at seek for
maritime supremacy, cooperation with regional and international partners is a more
effective strategy. China could consider the following options: Option One, set up a
permanent logistics supply base in this region allowing long term deployment of Chinese
Navy fleet to make quick reaction mission under request. Option Two, initiate or join in an
international joint navy fleet to impose counter piracy mission. Option Three, develop
several merchant ports in this region and build up land traffic system (railway and road)
connecting China inner land with them to provide additional transportation method avoiding
vulnerability of the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits.
In fact, all these three options are paralleled and intend to secure Chinese SLOCs by
comprehensive strategy. Pakistan, Chinese tradition all weathers and all dimensional friend
in this region, occupied the most important position in all the options.
In the last visit of Pakistan President Asif Zardari to China few days ago, President
reemphasized that Pakistan could offer China another “access to warm waters”[16]. In the
first years of General Musharraf’s regime, Pakistan redefined itself as an energy corridor
connecting East Asia (China) and South Asia (India) with the Middle East and Central Asia.
President Zardari and PPP administration inherited General Musharraf’s diplomatic legacy of
energy corridor strategy. Actually, this strategy did not emerge during General Musharraf
regime; it can be traced back to the 1960s as part of a strategy of Baluchistan’s
development initialled by Pakistan’s central government at that time. The trans-Pakistan
pipeline is at the core of this strategy and the Gwadar Port project is one of the
cornerstones.
The Gwadar Port project started on 22 March, 2002. Phase I has been completed and Phase
II is in process. This project costs 0.248 billion US$, of which 50 million US$ is paid by
Islamabad and the rest, 198 million US$, is contributed by China in the form of official
development assistance (ODA).
According to Pakistan’s government, “Gwadar as a deep-sea port will shortly be an
additional and alternate port to the existing port infrastructure of Pakistan. It will provide an
economical access to the sea for cargo generated in the Northern and southern parts of
Pakistan and Neighboring states. Pakistan offers the shortest route to Central Asia from its
ports in the south through a modem road and rail network”.[17] Phase I consists of three
multipurpose berths, each 200m long, a 4.5 km long approach channel dredged to
11.6m-12.5m (width 130-165m) and related port infrastructure and port handling
equipment and pilot boats, tugs, survey vessel etc. Phase II will consist of ten berths (two
hulk cargos, two oil, and six containers), a 5.0 km approach channel, a 600m turning basin,
and affiliated roads.
As the biggest overseas construction of China since the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, the
Gwadar project has drawn a lot of surmise and suspicion, especially with regard to China’s
intentions. Does China want to use Gwadar as her first overseas naval base? Is it the
shining and precious pendant of the “String of Pearls”?
Gwadar and Land Bridge between Pakistan and China
Resource: Pakistan Board of Investment, http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/
Considering the dual-use nature of ports, it’s obviously Gwadar port would be a pearl of the
string, but more important and more urgent concern for China is to ensure security ofSLOCs, just as mention above, China has no power and political intention to create Indian
Ocean maritime supremacy. Gwadar project could be expected to be part of Chinese energy
diversity strategy. It would shorten the thousands of miles than traditional ocean
transportation. Economic motive is not the only reason for China to support this project. To
ensure energy security, energy diversity strategy means not only source but also
transportation diversity. Currently, 50% of merchant ships passing through the Malacca
Straits carry Chinese products or imported materials and energy resources, ensuring their
security is crucial for Chinese future development, finding additional ports will help China to
reduce the burden of the Malacca Straits and to improve its maritime security.
Meanwhile, Gwadar project and Pakistan’s energy corridor strategy also could bring at least
another four advantages for China, domestically, regionally and even in the context of
Grand Strategy.
Firstly, it could make contribution to the Chinese Western Development Strategy.
Supposing Pakistani initiative of Sino-Pakistan railway system could be fulfilled, a
magnificent part of Chinese import oil could be transit via Gwadar port and transported by
railway to Xinjiang, China. This Autonomous Region is the Chinese first hydrocarbon energy
base in possession of sound and advanced oil and natural gas infrastructure. However after
six decades of exploitation, its own resources almost run out, enormous the oil and natural
gases transit via Pakistan not only could bring marvellous transportation costs retrench for
China, but more important, it also could fuel energy for the development of Xinjiang
hydrocarbon energy related industry. Also, the land transportation system ending at Gwadar
could be used as a bridge for the agriculture and industrial products from western part of
China to access to the Indian Ocean.
Secondly, it could bring an opportunity for China and India to cooperate in the
Middle East. Both China and India have a vested interest in open and secure sea lanes.
China has been providing the crucial assistance to Pakistan’s energy transportation
construction, and should enlarge and deepen its participation. Because the transportation
channel via Pakistan would not only transport natural gas or oil, but also contribute to the
mutual trust and interests among China, India and Pakistan. For both China and India,
Pakistani energy corridor strategy will have far-reaching influence. This pipeline project
connecting Pakistan and India or China proposal no matter via Gwadar or not will bring
China and India an opportunity to tight up their linkage with Middle-East countries. Middle
East energy suppliers now are also trying launching their own energy diversity strategy to
avoid the danger of over-depending on their western customers. To build up a pipeline by
jointed venture, China and India, as long-term and stable big customers in Middle East
energy market, would get important influence to the regional countries. As an example, the
first Gulf countries suggested to build a pipeline via Pakistan to China is not Iran, the ‘riot
state’ in the sight of USA, but Saudi Arab, the key ally of USA in the region. Gulf countries,
no matter their attitude toward current global economic structure, all wish could realize
diversity strategy, which offers the rising-up Asian powers a significant opportunity to
involve that region’s affairs.
Thirdly, it would help to improve the stability of regional situation and enhance
the mutual confident between India and Pakistan. The Pakistani energy corridor
strategy has the potential value for promoting regional peace, security and economic
development. Tensions on the Subcontinent have held the pipeline hostage for over a
decade, but these tensions are now thawing. The leaders of Pakistan and India have made
economic development their top priority. India cannot dream of achieving significant growth
without new sources of energy. But India deeply concerns the possibility that in case the
regional situation getting tension, Pakistan would like to turn off the tap. New Delhi also
worried about the pipeline connecting India with Iran would be a negative factor to newemerging India-USA ‘partnership’, Washington strongly oppose any projects Iran involved.
Saudi Arab-Pakistan-India pipeline is not welcomed by New Delhi because of its heavy costs
and tiny benefits to India. If China could join the project to share a certain route of the
pipeline, Chinese back to the project bid could bring more confidence to India. Then the
triangle relations among China, Pakistan and India will be expected less competing while
more cooperation.
The last and not the least, it would provide more options for China to reply to the
Malacca Straits Dilemma. In principle, the essential request of maritime power is to
impose marginal water control. Thus, the expanse of Chinese seek maritime power should
aim at south and east direction to protect its natural resources on its marginal water and
exclusive economic zone (EEC) and to claim its sovereignty over the dispute territory. But
given the geopolitical reality——the coalition between some of Chinese neighboring
countries and the global sea supremacy——confronting and challenging this regional
maritime security structure is not necessarily meet Chinese interests and beyond Chinese
capability. In this context of Grand Strategy, part of strategy of some Chinese neighboring
countries for the global sea power supremacy is to form blockade surrounding China, so
called “the first island chain”. So access to the Indian Ocean via Pakistan could reduce the
dependency of China on the Malacca Straits and correspondently devalue the function of
some Chinese neighboring countries in the Grand Strategy of the global hegemony. Such
response to “the first island chain” is somewhat kind of application of Liddell Hart's “indirect
approach” theory. Just like a well-known expression “aim at a pigeon and shoot at a crow”,
China also could try to manage its Pacific Ocean challenge with the help of its Indian Ocean
chess game.
But it should be pointed out that, realization of such blue print shouldn’t be expected
recently because of security tension, political turbulence and geographical environment
difficulties in Pakistan. At present Gwadar is symbol of friendship and will be beneficial in
the future if Pakistan’s situation improves enough to be an energy corridor as is expected.
But it needs more time to justify its value.The stability of Pakistan is crucial precondition of
Chinese cooperative maritime strategy.
Just like President Zardari addressed, “a stronger China needs a stronger Pakistan”[18]. To
help Pakistan to improve its stability and enhance its security is not only the responsibility
for China, but also the interest of China. After all, China should acknowledge that, marching
to westward also reaches at the ocean.
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